The central choice was to line the two tenures up by time in power rather than by calendar year, giving each leader the same fourteen-year runway from the moment of succession. Their eras differ so much in technology and circumstance that a shared calendar axis would set two different worlds side by side; aligning on elapsed time instead makes the pace of testing from each leader's early years directly readable.
On matched windows the difference in scale is plain: Kim Jong Il's first fourteen years hold 8 recorded tests in all, whereas Kim Jong Un's total had reached 272 partway through his thirteenth year, the point where the source data ends — and even that is a lower bound rather than a closed figure. The chart is about how steeply each tally climbs from the start of a tenure, not a ranking of the two leaders or an account of why the pace shifted.
The dataset is a fixed snapshot, and its most recent record is dated 4 November 2024. That leaves Kim Jong Un's thirteenth year only partly covered and his fourteenth year outside the data altogether, so his later totals are lower bounds rather than settled counts. The empty fourteenth-year point marks missing coverage; it does not mean a year without tests.
The figures count individual test records, and a single day can hold several — one 2006 date contributes seven records, one 2022 date contributes eight. The chart therefore shows how many recorded tests occurred, not how many separate days saw a launch. Failed and unconfirmed tests are counted on the same footing as successful, confirmed ones.
The database's threshold is a capability standard — systems judged able to carry roughly 500 kg over 300 km — not a measure of how far any given test actually flew. Counts were placed into 12-month succession windows and summed as observed, with gaps left empty rather than filled in.
It does not measure missile capability. A larger count means more frequent testing under the database's criteria, not longer range, better accuracy, heavier payload, or greater military strength, and the two tenures unfolded in very different technological and geopolitical conditions. The height gap is a difference in recorded activity, not a ranking of leaders or a gauge of intent, and the chart offers no reading on why the pace changed — sanctions, diplomacy, and strategy all sit outside it.
It is also a filtered view rather than every launch. Systems below the payload-and-range threshold, along with rocket artillery and other activity outside the database's scope, are not counted, and nuclear tests are a separate matter entirely. The chart carries no breakdown by missile type, range class, outcome, launch site, or purpose. Read left to right, it answers a single question — how the count of qualifying tests accumulates across each leader's early years — and the "At succession" point stands for the first twelve months in power, not the moment of handover.